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THE EFFECTS OF DEPTH AND DISTANCE IN A
CRIMINAL CODE ON CHARGING,
SENTENCING, AND PROSECUTOR POWER
RONALD

F. WRIGHT & RODNEY L. ENGEN*

Today's conventional wisdom about criminal justice in the United
States tells us that criminal codes do not matter much. Particularly
in light of reforms that have made sentencing laws less
discretionary, a prosecutor's application of criminal statutes is
thought to be more important than the code provisions themselves.
Despite these claims, little is known about the actual use of
prosecutorialdiscretion under these kinds of sentencing laws. In
this Article, we examine charge movement in North Carolina. The
data show that charge reductions are common, occurring in roughly
half of all felony cases that resulted in conviction, and that the
prosecutor's decision to reduce criminal charges has a large effect
on average sentence severity.
These effects do not apply equally, however, to all crimes. When a
group of related crimes offer deeper charging options (that is, the
number of charges that might apply to a given set of facts), the
prosecution and defense agree more often to reduce the charges.
Large distances between the sentences that attach to available
chargingoptions make it less likely that the prosecution and defense
will agree on a particularcharge reduction. Thus, plea bargaining
is not an entirely free-market exercise that allows the parties to
negotiate a customized outcome. Even in a world of charge-driven
sentencing where prosecutorialdiscretion is a dominant feature, the
substantive criminallaw matters.

* Rodney Engen is an Associate Professor of Sociology at North Carolina State
University; Ronald Wright is a Professor of Law at Wake Forest University. The authors
thank Stephanos Bibas, Steve Chanenson, Jennifer Collins, and Michael O'Hear for
comments on an earlier draft and the staff of the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Commission for providing access to North Carolina charging and sentencing
data.
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INTRODUCTION

Today's conventional wisdom about criminal justice in the
United States tells us that criminal codes do not matter much. The
real impact of the criminal law appears not in the statute books, but in
the choices of criminal prosecutors who apply the criminal laws.
Moreover, the law says very little about how prosecutors should
choose. Legal rules grant broad powers to prosecutors, including the
power to decide which cases to prosecute, to recommend bail, to
dismiss or revise charges after the original filing, to negotiate guilty
pleas to less serious charges than might be provable in court, and to
recommend sentences.' It is difficult to convince judges to interfere
with prosecutor charging decisions.2 Similarly, while state legislatures
have been eager to enact laws regulating judicial discretion in
sentencing, they have been reluctant to impose similar constraints on
prosecutors.3
Thus, for the most part, prosecutorial discretion in charging and
plea bargaining is unreviewable-leading some socio-legal scholars to
argue that the prosecutor may be the single most powerful actor in
1. See generally NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991) (reviewing authority and functions of criminal prosecutors).
2. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 803-63 (2d ed. 2003) (reviewing limited efforts
by judges to review prosecutorial charging decisions).
3. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 67-68 (1996) (comparing limits on
judicial sentencing discretion to limits on prosecutorial sentencing discretion).
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the criminal justice system.4 In addition to remaining beyond the
reach of conventional sources of law, these discretionary choices are

easier to hide than a judge's discretion in sentencing and remain
largely outside the spotlight of academic inquiry.5
Prosecutorial decisionmaking takes on even greater importance
in the context of late twentieth century sentencing reforms. For more
than a generation now, sentencing laws in the United States have
become more determinate and less discretionary,6 potentially

increasing the power of the prosecutor even further.

Numerous

scholars have argued that nondiscretionary sentencing laws, including

mandatory

minimum

sentences

and

presumptive

sentencing

guidelines, make the charge of conviction a more important predictor

of the sentence.

They increase prosecutorial discretion over

sentences relative to judicial discretion.7 Moreover, these scholars

argue that nondiscretionary sentencing reforms encourage bargaining
for guilty pleas and allow prosecutors to circumvent particular

sentencing provisions, potentially thwarting the efforts of legal
reformers to achieve greater uniformity in punishment.8
Despite these claims, we know little about the actual use of
prosecutorial discretion under these kinds of sentencing reforms.

One common working assumption is that prosecutors frequently
engage in plea negotiations with the defendant and may amend initial

4. See generally William F. McDonald, The Prosecutor's Domain, in THE
PROSECUTOR 15 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979) (providing a framework for
understanding the role of the prosecutor in the administration of justice).
5. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY, at vi (1969) ("Writers about law and government characteristically recognize the
role of discretion and explore all around the perimeter of it but seldom try to penetrate
it."); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1102 (1952) (characterizing prosecutorial discretion as an abandonment of law).
6. Determinate sentencing laws are those that empower the sentencing judge to
assign a fixed prison term to a defendant rather than deferring the choice to a parole
authority. For a discussion of the relevant terminology, see Steven L. Chanenson, The
Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 381-86 (2005) (discussing use of
"determinate" and "discretionary" terminology).
7.

See, e.g.,

BUREAU

OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,

NATIONAL

ASSESSMENT

OF

STRUCTURED SENTENCING 126 (1996) (highlighting the concern of displacing discretion

from judges to prosecutors when trying to control sentencing discretion); John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Michael Tonry, Hard Choices: Critical Trade-offs in the Implementation of
Sentencing Reform Through Guidelines, in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS ON
CRIMINAL SENTENCING 155, 159 (Michael Tonry & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1983)

(same); TONRY, supra note 3, at 146-59 (same); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform
and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive"
Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 550-51 (1978) (exploring interaction of sentencing law
reforms and prosecutorial charging and plea bargain practices).
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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charges as a means of compromise. This working assumption,
however, does not tell us the amount of charge movement we are
likely to find in a given system, or in particular types of cases. Nor
does it tell us what effect charge reductions are likely to have on the
severity of sentences. 9 Very little systematic empirical research
examines how often prosecutors reduce charges or the impact that
these reductions have on sentencing uniformity in jurisdictions with
comprehensive sentencing guidelines. 10 Thus, research on charging
decisions has greater value than ever, both in practical and theoretical
terms.
We pursue three goals in this Article. First, we examine the
amount of charge movement in North Carolina and estimate the
impact that charge reductions have on sentencing outcomes. Since
1994, North Carolina has operated a structured sentencing system
(one form of sentencing guidelines) that ties the sentence imposed to
the charge of conviction and the offender's criminal history.
Statewide data from this system allow us to measure the prevalence of
charge reductions by prosecutors and the effect of those charge
reductions on the sentences that judges later impose on criminal
defendants. We compare the initial felony charges that prosecutors
filed with the charges at the time of conviction and then compare the
sentences that defendants ultimately received with the sentences they
likely would have received had they been convicted of the initial
charge. The evidence shows that charge reductions are common,
occurring in roughly half of all felony cases that resulted in conviction

9. The most closely-studied context involving the interplay of prosecutorial charging
practices and sentencing outcomes is the operation of mandatory minimum sentencing
laws. Several empirical studies and abundant anecdotal evidence indicate that prosecutors
often mitigate the impact of specific mandatory sentencing laws by dismissing or reducing
charges.
E.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 53-89
(1991) (exploring mandatory minimum provisions with empirical and anecdotal evidence);
Timothy Bynum, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Implementation of a Legislative
Mandate, in IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES 47, 58 (Merry Morash ed.,
1982); David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 599 (2005); Jill
Farrell, Mandatory Minimum Firearm Penalties: A Source of Sentencing Disparity?, 5
JUST. RES. & POL'Y 95, 96 (2003).
10. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 7, at 98, 126 (describing

"limited research" now available on plea bargaining effects of sentencing guidelines and
expressing concern that "little systematic evidence" is available on shift of discretion to
prosecutors).
11. Because virtually all charge movement in North Carolina moves from charges
with higher sentences to charges with lower sentences, we use the terms "charge
movement" and "charge reductions" interchangeably.
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and that the choice to reduce criminal charges has a large effect on
average sentence severity. Indeed, the impact of charging decisions
on average sentences is greater12 than the impact of judicial decisions
made at the time of sentencing.
A second purpose of our research is to explore some structural
features of the criminal code and related sentencing guidelines that
may be important for understanding charge reductions and their
impact on sentencing. While it may be true that sentencing reforms
generally increase prosecutorial discretion over punishment, we argue
that laws designed to limit judicial discretion in sentencing also have
the effects-though not necessarily intended-of structuring
prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining, and of
determining the impact those decisions have on sentencing. Thus,
presumptive sentencing guidelines may increase the overall power of
prosecutors to control sentencing, but guidelines also constrain that
power in specific areas. 3
To understand how these legal structures can affect charging
decisions and sentencing outcomes, it is necessary to develop some
conceptual tools for describing this structure. We propose that it is
useful to think about two dimensions of the criminal code and
sentencing guidelines: depth and distance. First, the depth of the
criminal code refers to the number of charging options available to
prosecutors-charges that might apply to a given set of facts.
Criminal codes often leave prosecutors several plausible choices
based on a given set of facts. For example, in North Carolina, a
stabbing might support charges ranging from assault "with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury,"14 all the way
down to misdemeanor "simple assault."' 5 We suggest that the depth
of charging options for a particular type of crime may affect the
likelihood that prosecutors will reduce felony charges postindictment. 6

12. See infra Parts III-IV.
13. Presumptive guidelines are legal rules that designate a sentence or range of
sentences that are presumptively correct for a given case. These guidelines allow the
judge (based on special justifications) to sentence higher or lower in unusual cases, while
still remaining within an absolute statutory maximum and minimum sentencing range. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 7, at 2 (defining presumptive guidelines).
Appellate courts enforce the presumption by overturning non-guideline sentences that are
not adequately justified. Id. at 49-53 (describing the role of appellate review in
presumptive guidelines).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (2005) (Class C felony).
15. Id. § 14-33(a) (Class 2 misdemeanor).
16. For further exploration of this concept, see infra Part II.
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The second conceptual tool is the distance between charging
options, which refers to the relative difference in the sentences that
attach to the more- and less-serious charging options.
In a
nondiscretionary sentencing system, large distances between charging
options will predictably lead to large differences in the sentences that
judges actually impose. The effect of charge reductions on sentences
ultimately depends on the distance between the starting and ending
charges, and thus depends on the location of those crimes in the
sentencing grid.
What are the effects of depth and distance in the criminal code
and accompanying sentencing guidelines? The data we examine show
that the proportion of charges that prosecutors reduce, along with the
size of the sentence discounts that defendants receive, vary from
crime to crime. We suggest that these differences between types of
crimes do not depend solely on a prosecutor's individualized sense of
justice. These differences also reflect the constraints that depth and
distance in the criminal code place on the prosecutor.
When a group of related crimes offers deeper charging options,
the prosecution and defense agree more often to reduce the charges.
Large distances between the available charging options make it less
likely that the prosecution and defense will agree on a particular
charge reduction.17 Perhaps more strikingly, in those areas of the
code where distances between charges are greater, the effect on
sentences is unmistakable. When charge reductions do occur despite
the large distances between the options, those reductions explain a
large component of the impact on the sentence imposed in the case. 8
Thus, in theoretical terms, this Article updates-for a world
dominated by plea bargaining and mandatory sentencing-the idea
(today considered quaint) that the substantive criminal law
determines the outcome of the criminal process. Plea bargaining is
not an entirely Coasian exercise that allows the parties to negotiate a
customized outcome without regard to the legal rules that create
starting points. 9 Both depth and distance-the number of viable
landing points built into a group of crimes and the spacing between
those landing points-influence the actual movement of charges and
the sentences that result. Even in a world where prosecutorial

17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960)

(describing a theoretical economic model of bargaining that treats legal entitlements as
irrelevant to outcome of negotiation).
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discretion is an acknowledged reality, the substantive criminal law
matters.
The third purpose of our research is intensely practical.
Knowing the amount of charge movement at work in different parts
of a system can offer dividends for attorneys practicing criminal law.
Virtually every attorney working in the criminal justice system keeps
near at hand a reference work showing the elements of crimes and
their refinements over the years by the courts. 2° Given the range of
prosecutor choices allowed in a system that only rarely tests the
charges at trial, a second standard reference should appear on the
shelves (or in the computer files) of every attorney practicing criminal
law: charge movement charts. Such charts would show details about
the frequency and size of charge movements that happen for
particular categories of crimes and defendants. The charts might
break down the data by county, by year, or by other relevant
distinctions. We present a first draft of charge movement charts that
ought to become standard resources for anyone who wants to
understand (and predict for clients) the operation of this system.21
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we summarize
theoretical arguments about the importance of charge bargaining and
the influence of the prosecutor as criminal justice systems have
moved toward more mandatory sentencing rules. In this part, we also
review the criminological and legal scholarship that has begun to
explore this promising field. In Part II, we examine some important
structural features of North Carolina's structured sentencing system,
including the concepts of depth and distance. Then in Part III, we
look more closely at charge movement across the system as a whole
assault, robbery,
and for several different types of crimes:
kidnapping, burglary, and cocaine delivery. Finally, in Part IV we
examine the effects of charge movements within these crime types on
the severity of sentences that result.
I. CHARGE MOVEMENT AS A COMPONENT OF PROSECUTORIAL
POWER

Sentencing guidelines and other forms of determinate and
nondiscretionary sentencing laws can isolate the influence of many
different components of the judge's sentencing decision. Under a
20. E.g., ROBERT L. FARB, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES: A GUIDEBOOK ON THE
ELEMENTS OF CRIME (5th ed. 2001) (description of crime elements and judicial
interpretations of proof necessary to establish elements); NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL
LAW AND MOTOR VEHICLE HANDBOOK (Gould Publications 2005-2006 ed.) (same).
21. See infra pp. 1956-67.
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discretionary system, it was plain that factors such as an offender's
prior criminal record or cooperation with the government could
influence the judge's choice of sentence. Yet each of these factors
mingled with other factors in a sea of discretion. With the arrival of
sentencing guidelines, the separate influence of distinct sentencing
factors on the judge is now easier to trace. The result has been more
precise sentencing terminology and more overt thinking about the
proper interaction of sentencing factors, old and new.22
Sentencing guidelines cast a similar light on the separate
components of prosecutorial power. It was clear under discretionary
sentencing laws that the prosecutor's choices could affect the
sentencing outcome, but it was impossible to sort out the separate
effects of different prosecutorial tools. Charge reductions, sentence
recommendations, decisions about the number of counts, stipulations
about facts relevant to sentencing, threatened increases in charges,
possible referral to immigration authorities, and so forth, all had
unspecified effects on the sentence.2 3 In jurisdictions with sentencing
guidelines, the separate impact of at least some of these specific
prosecutorial tools became easier to isolate.
Criminologists and legal scholars have just begun to appreciate
the possibilities.2 4 Because a determinate sentencing environment
makes visible the sentencing consequences of charging decisions, it
becomes possible to filter out the impact of charge reductions from
the other actions of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges that
influence the sentence.

22. See Michael M. Mihm & Nancy Gertner, Teaching Judges How to Sentence, 11

FED. SENT'G REP. 96, 99 (1998) (discussing the new grammar and vocabulary of
sentencing that federal sentencing guidelines make possible); Marc L. Miller, A Map of
Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and
the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1365 (2005) (discussing the
ability of sentencing guidelines to enrich working vocabulary of sentencing practices).
23. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER, DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, MARC L. MILLER &
RONALD

F.

WRIGHT,

SENTENCING

LAW AND

POLICY:

CASES,

STATUTES,

AND

GUIDELINES 100-08 (2003) (summarizing research on nonguideline sentencing practices);
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 550-51 ("[F]ixed and presumptive sentencing schemes ... are
unlikely to achieve their objectives so long as they leave the prosecutor's power to
formulate charges and to bargain for guilty pleas unchecked.").
24. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as
Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252-59 (2004) (exploring sentencing impact of
centralized charging and plea bargaining guidelines issued by United States Department

of Justice).
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Sentencing Reforms and ProsecutorialPower

Even before the first state adopted presumptive sentencing
guidelines, scholars predicted that these attempts to regulate
sentencing outcomes would merely shift control over sentencing from
judges and correctional officials to prosecutors. Albert Alschuler's
scathing critique of charge-based sentencing reforms makes the case:
Although prosecutors' offices, in practice, have probably had a
greater influence on sentencing than any of the other agencies
(including state legislatures), the call for sentencing reform has
largely ignored this extensive prosecutorial power. In my view,
fixed and presumptive sentencing schemes ... are unlikely to
achieve their objectives so long as they leave the prosecutor's
power unchecked. Indeed ... this sort of reform is likely to
produce its antithesis-a system every bit as lawless as the
current sentencing regime, in which discretion is concentrated
in an inappropriate agency, and in which the benefits of this
discretion are made available only to defendants who sacrifice
their constitutional rights.25
Other scholars have leveled similar criticisms, arguing that
presumptive guidelines tie sentencing options to the charge of
conviction, much like mandatory minimum sentencing laws do. Thus,
the guidelines give prosecutors substantial control over sentences by
adjusting those charges. Without some mechanism in place to guard
against rampant charge bargaining, there is no guarantee that
sentencing will be any more predictable, uniform, or fair under
guidelines than it is under discretionary sentencing.2 6
Despite these now familiar arguments, relatively little empirical
evidence exists to show what prosecutors in guideline jurisdictions
actually do about charge reductions." A few studies, though, have
started the inquiry. Among the earliest empirical analyses of
prosecutorial discretion under guidelines are two studies of charging
and sentencing practices in Minnesota, a state that adopted
presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1980.28 Each study found that
25. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 550-51.
26. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, MAKING

THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE

CRIME:

A

CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO SENTENCING REFORM 10-15 (1977); Coffee & Tonry, supra note

7, at 157 (arguing that sentencing guidelines may be undermined by charge bargaining or
rewards of leniency).
27. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 7, at 98-100 (discussing the

impact of sentencing guidelines on plea bargaining).
28. Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate
Sentencing: An Investigationof the Hydraulic Displacementof Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
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charge reductions were common both before and after the sentencing
guidelines took effect.2 9 Surprisingly little changed after the adoption

of guidelines, either in the frequency of charge reductions or in the
factors that cause charge reductions. 0

Moreover, criminologist

Terence Miethe found that outright dismissals of less-serious charges
remained more common than charge reductions through the years.31
Importantly, in both the pre- and post-guidelines periods, sentence

bargains (negotiations over the sentence to recommend to the judge)
were more common than charge bargains.32
One of the more intriguing findings from the Minnesota
research, for our purposes, is that charge reduction in exchange for a
guilty plea occurred more often in the most serious cases. Miethe
reported that:
[C]harge reductions were about three times more likely for
offenders whose severity/history combination placed them
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 161 (1987); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic

Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and
Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337, 342 (1985). Stephen
Schulhofer and Ilene Nagel provide a detailed discussion of plea bargaining under the
federal sentencing guidelines based on interviews with U.S. Attorneys, trial prosecutors,
probation officers, and judges, but their research does not provide quantitative data on the
actual frequency of charge bargaining or its impact on sentencing. See generally Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines:
The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989) (exploring the relationship
between the federal sentencing guidelines and plea negotiation practices in the fifteen
months preceding Mistretta v. United States).
29. See Miethe, supra note 28, at 163 (reporting the rates of charge reduction before
and after the sentencing guidelines took effect); Miethe & Moore, supra note 28, at 348
(same).
30. See Miethe, supra note 28, at 165 (noting that "charge reductions" decreased
slightly after the implementation of the sentencing guidelines); Miethe & Moore, supra
note 28, at 348 tbl.1 (noting that the rate of charge reductions decreased from 40.8% to
39.2% after the implementation of the sentencing guidelines).
31. See Miethe, supra note 28, at 163, 168-70. For example, in 1982-two years after
the adoption of guidelines-39% of cases received a charge dismissal as part of a
negotiated plea, but only 8% received a reduction in the primary charge. This compares
with 33% and 13%, respectively, in 1978, two years before the adoption of guidelines. Id.
at 163. The findings appear to contradict a 1984 evaluation performed by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, however. Richard Frase, describing those findings,
reports that "the proportion of cases involving charge bargaining increased, while the
overall rate of sentence bargaining decreased" following the introduction of guidelines.
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, in 32 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 131, 177 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004). It is not
immediately apparent why the studies reached different conclusions.
32. See Miethe & Moore, supra note 28, at 348 (indicating that a charge bargain was
obtained in 40.8% of pre-guideline cases and 39.2% of post-guideline cases, while a
negotiated sentence was obtained in 53.9% of pre-guideline cases and 42% of postguideline cases).
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below the dispositional line (e.g., felons whose presumptive
disposition on conviction would have been a prison sentence).
Sentence concessions, however, were far more likely for
offenders above this dispositional line at each time period.33
Richard Frase, describing an earlier evaluation by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, also reports that "vertical"
charge bargaining increased among these serious cases following the
introduction of guidelines in Minnesota, so that "by 1981, many more
of the cases eligible for presumptive prison-commit sentences (based
on the 'real' offense) were being convicted of less serious charges,
carrying no presumptive prison term."34 Charge reductions were
especially prevalent among first-time violent offenders and child sex
offenders, for whom the legislature had attempted to increase
incarceration rates.35 In child sexual abuse cases, charge reductions
increased from 50 to 80%.36
These studies reveal one of the ways that the guidelines not only
structure sentencing decisions, but structure plea negotiations as well.
Presumably, in Minnesota, parties used charge bargaining more often
in cases where conviction on the original charge would result in a
presumed prison sentence. In such cases, conviction on a lesser
charge allowed probation or a shorter jail sentence as the only
possible outcomes. Among less serious cases, a reduction in the
charges would have less impact on the type of sentence that was likely
to result, so negotiations more often revolved around the sentence
duration.
Research by Stephen Schulhofer and Ilene Nagel on the charging
practices of federal prosecutors under the federal sentencing
guidelines also suggests that prosecutors frequently exercise their
discretion to reduce sentences, often to avoid the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentences, particularly in drug and weapon
possession cases.37 Based on interviews and a sample of case files,
Nagel and Schulhofer concluded (much like Miethe and Moore) that
"[c]ontrary to often-heard claims that the guideline system has
33. Miethe, supra note 28, at 165.
34. Frase, supra note 31, at 176. Vertical charge bargains involve the reduction of the
most serious charge to a less severe charge. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 177-78.
36. Id. at 178. Interestingly, Frase reports that charge reductions in child sex cases
decreased again following decisions in 1981 that allowed judges to depart from the
guidelines in these cases. Id.
37. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 501, 501-03 (1992).
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transferred to prosecutors all discretion previously exercised by the
courts, the empirical data suggest that [guideline circumvention]
occurs in only a minority of cases '38 (which they estimated to fall
between 15 and 25%). 39
In a more recent analysis utilizing data from a larger sample of
federal courts, these researchers reached essentially the same
conclusion: guidelines had not transferred all discretion from judges
to prosecutors, but prosecutors still circumvented the guidelines in
between 25% and 35% of cases, a substantial minority.4" These
studies demonstrate that guideline circumvention occurs through a
variety of mechanisms, including guideline-factor bargaining,
horizontal and vertical charge bargaining, fact bargaining, and the
substantial-assistance motions. 1
Finally, in an innovative empirical analysis, Langley Miller and
John Sloan estimated the effect of charge reductions on sentences and
compared this with the effect of judicial discretion in the sentencing
of 400 felony cases in an unnamed city in the North Central United
States, which used voluntary sentencing guidelines.4 2 Miller and
Sloan measured the magnitude of charge reductions by taking the
difference, in months, between the midpoint of the sentence range for
the primary charge that the prosecutor initially filed and the midpoint
of the sentencing range for the primary charge on which the
defendant was actually convicted. 43 They measured judicialdiscretion
as the difference in months between the actual sentence ordered and

38. Id. at 557.
39. Id. at 553.
40. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997). Moreover, the researchers observed that
guideline circumvention is often "more procedural than substantive."
Nagel &
Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 551. In other words, "[t]he actual sentence may not be
undeserved and may not differ from the one the judge would have imposed absent the
plea," yet "the sentencing decision is not being made by the judge, as the guidelines
contemplated" but primarily by prosecutors. Id.
41. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 547-51 (describing the different
mechanisms used to circumvent the sentencing guidelines).
42. J. Langley Miller & John J. Sloan, III, A Study of CriminalJustice Discretion,22 J.
CRIM. JUST. 107, 118 (1994) (finding substantial amounts of prosecutorial and judicial
discretion operationalized as charge reduction and sentence reduction). Voluntary
sentencing guidelines create suggested sentences or sentence ranges for categories of
cases, but allow the sentencing judge to depart from the suggested outcomes without any
greater risk of reversal on appeal. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 7, at 2.

43. Miller & Sloan, supra note 42, at 111.
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the midpoint of the guideline range for the primary charge at
conviction.'
Miller and Sloan did not report how often charges were reduced
between the time of filing and conviction, but they did find that
reduced charges led to presumptive sentences that were forty-six
months lower on average (down from 210 months to 164 months) for
offenders who were sentenced to prison.45

Judges exercised their

discretion to reduce sentences even further, by more than 100 months
on average.46 Similarly, prosecutors reduced sentences for offenders

sentenced to probation by an average of forty-one months, while
judges further reduced sentences by an average fifty-nine months.47
Miller and Sloan concluded that, contrary to the prediction that
prosecutors wield greater control over sentencing than judges do,

"the amount of judicial discretion was significantly greater than the
amount of prosecutorial discretion."48
B.

Motives for ChargeMovement

The research summarized above suggests that there is some
reason to worry about the effects of determinate and
nondiscretionary sentencing on prosecutorial power. While initial
fears that prosecutors would entirely usurp sentencing authority have

not come to fruition, it is also clear that prosecutors circumvent
guidelines through charge bargaining in a sizeable minority of cases.
As a result, reputed gains in sentencing uniformity under presumptive
guidelines may be less than some scholars have claimed.4 9
To understand this interaction between prosecutorial power and
sentencing laws, we must explore several possible explanations for
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id. at 112.
46. Id. at 113.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 111. Like the Minnesota studies described above, see supra notes 28-33 and
accompanying text, Miller and Sloan also presented multivariate analyses of charge and
sentencing outcomes. Miller & Sloan, supra note 42. Contrary to Miethe and Moore's
research, however, they found that the statutory seriousness of the initial charge filed had
a negative effect on the magnitude of charge reductions. Id. In other words, prosecutors
were less willing to reduce or gave smaller reductions when offenders were charged with
more serious crimes. It is difficult to interpret these seemingly contradictory findings,
however, given that the earlier studies were conducted in a state with presumptive
guidelines, while the later study was conducted in a state with voluntary guidelines. Id. at
129; Miethe & Moore, supra note 28, at 337.
49. See TONRY, supra note 3, at 40-49, 54-58 (arguing that sentencing guidelines
generally have increased uniformity in sentencing and reduced unwarranted disparities
associated with social status characteristics; acknowledging, however, that the research
does not take into account the possible effects of charge bargaining).
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why prosecutors are inclined to reduce charges. Reduced charges
might simply reflect a prosecutor's judgment that the initial charges
are not provable at trial, and thus revised charges grow out of
necessity rather than prosecutorial choice. There is certainly some
truth to this explanation based on necessity. Perhaps the police" or
inexperienced assistant district attorneys who file the original charges
place too high a value on their cases and overcharge relative to what
prosecutors are likely to be able to prove in court. Prosecutors may
also learn more over time about the credibility of witnesses and the
strength of evidence or about new developments (such as witnesses
leaving town or the victim's actions) that reduce the value of the case
by making conviction on the most serious charge less likely.
Nevertheless, there are several weaknesses with the necessity
theory of charge reductions.
Unless prosecutors intentionally
overcharge in a sizeable portion of cases, the initial filing of charges
shows that, by the prosecutor's own assessment, the evidence meets
the standard of legal sufficiency (probable cause) to support those
charges."
The studies reviewed here reinforce the notion that
prosecutors reduced charges for reasons other than the weakness of
the evidence.52 These studies were limited to defendants who were
convicted. Thus, they found charge movement even after the weakest
cases in the system had already been weeded out either through
dismissals or acquittals.
Prosecutorial choice is likely to explain a larger part of the
charge movement. Researchers who have examined the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion under sentencing guidelines or mandatory
minimum sentencing laws typically explain charge reductions based
on factors other than the strength of the available evidence.53 They
argue that when prosecutors select charges to avoid sentencing laws,
it is either because they conflict with local norms or because it is
simply expedient to reduce or dismiss charges in exchange for guilty
50. Police typically file the original charges in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN STAT.
§ 15A-501(1) (2005).
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-611(b) (2005); AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard

3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc-blk.
html#3.9. When the police initially file charges, they must survive an immediate test with a
magistrate, who rules within hours of an arrest whether there is probable cause to support
the charges that the police officer selected. § 15A-511(c)(1). Moreover, police officers
work repeatedly with the same prosecutors and learn the standards that those prosecutors
will apply to the evidence. These routines probably keep the charges that police officers
select at the beginning of the case fairly well anchored to the realities of the courtroom.
52.

See supra Part I.A.

53. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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pleas.54 A number of studies specifically offer normative explanations
for charge reductions. For example, Frase interpreted prosecutors'
use of charge reductions in certain cases (first-time violent offenders
and child sex cases) as resistance to new statutes that tried to change
sentencing practices for those crimes in Minnesota." Similarly, Nagel
and Schulhofer argued that Assistant United States Attorneys
frequently circumvented mandatory minimum sentences they found
to be excessively harsh, instead applying charges with what they
considered to be more appropriate punishments.5 6
Organizational concerns also point to a theory of charge
reductions based on prosecutorial choice rather than weak evidence.
The routine reliance on plea bargaining in American criminal justice
(95% of felony convictions nationally are the result of guilty pleas)57
largely reflects the reality that the state simply does not pay for jury
trials for most defendants. District Attorneys must economize,
selecting their highest priority cases to receive the most time and
resources from their limited budgets, while the bulk of cases must be
resolved without the expense of a trial.5 8 Charge reductions provide a
way to handle the high volume of cases, offering an incentive for
defendants to give up their right to trial and a chance-even a remote
chance-at acquittal.59 Prosecutors might also want to leverage
smaller cases into larger ones, asking some defendants to cooperate in
investigations against other suspects. Such cooperation carries a
price.
In a structured sentencing system such as the one in North
Carolina, reduced charges translate into a highly predictable

54. Coffee & Tonry, supra note 7, at 158.
55. See Frase, supra note 31, at 174. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael
Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences,

86 IOWA L. REV. 1043 (2001) (discussing the effect of federal sentencing guidelines on
sentences for drug charges).
56. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 551.
57. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING STATISTICS,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
58. See ARTHUR J. ROSSETr & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA

BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 7 (1976) (stating that plea bargains are
encouraged because of limited trial resources); Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti,
ProsecutorialResources, Plea Bargaining,and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 149, 149-50 (2001) (developing game theory model of plea bargaining based on

assumption that plea bargaining responds to limited prosecutor resources).
59. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
CriminalJustice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129-34 (2005) (describing the effect of federal

sentencing guidelines on certainty of guilty plea discount, and resulting effects on acquittal
rate).
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reduction in the sentence.' Evidence also suggests that prosecutors
place a higher value on gaining convictions than on the seriousness of
the conviction charges, and that they pay a professional price for
acquittals.61 For all of these reasons, charge bargaining is an
attractive choice both for the prosecutor and for the defendant.
Reduced charges sometimes are necessary because of weak evidence,
but they also result from bargaining in many cases.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF NORTH CAROLINA'S CRIMINAL CODE AND
SENTENCING LAWS

Our research centers on sentencing and charging practices in one
prominent guideline jurisdiction: North Carolina. The intersection of
criminal code, charging practices, and sentences in this one state
should offer lessons for determinate sentencing laws more generally.
In this part of the Article, we outline the most pertinent features of
the substantive criminal code (defining the elements of crimes) and
the statutes that create a "structured sentencing" regime.
A.

Structured Sentencing and Charge Bargains

Until 1981, North Carolina operated a traditional discretionary
sentencing system.62 Criminal statutes offered a wide range of
sentencing options for a judge to consider, and the judge set a
maximum and minimum sentence for each offender. The Parole
Commission then determined the actual time a defendant served.63

Concern over the lack of uniformity in sentences led to the passage of
the Fair Sentencing Act ("FSA"), which set "presumptive" prison
terms for every crime, required judges to give special justifications for
any prison sentence above or below the presumptive term, and (at
least in the beginning) abolished the Parole Commission. 64 The closer
60. See infra Part IV.
61. Cf Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career
Objectives of Federal Prosecutors,48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 628 (2005) (explaining that federal
prosecutors in districts with high private-sector salaries go to trial more often, hoping to
develop and display litigation skills).
62. See STEVENS H. CLARKE, LAW OF SENTENCING, PROBATION, AND PAROLE IN
NORTH CAROLINA 46-47 (2d ed. 1997); SANDRA SHANE-DuBOW ET AL., SENTENCING
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 203-05 (1985)

(discussing North
sentencing laws).

Carolina development

from discretionary

to nondiscretionary

63. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North
Carolina, 1980-2000, in 29 CRIME & JUSTICE:

A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39 (Michael

Tonry ed., 2002) (explaining the conditions that led to the passage of the Fair Sentencing
Act).

64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4 (1988) (repealed 1993).
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legal controls of the FSA, however, were paper thin. In reality,
judges found it easy to ignore the presumptive terms by invoking
boilerplate "aggravating" or "mitigating" circumstances to support
their higher or lower sentences, drawn from the same broad ranges
that were available before the arrival of the FSA.6 5 Soon the
crowding in the prisons led the legislature to resurrect the Parole
Commission, asking that body to release prisoners before they
completed the terms announced by their sentencing judges.6 6
A second, more emphatic move in the direction of determinate
and nondiscretionary sentences took effect late in 1994.
The
Structured Sentencing Act ("SSA") created a grid-familiar in
"sentencing guideline" states-with a vertical axis reflecting the
seriousness of the crime and the horizontal axis reflecting the extent
of the offender's prior criminal record. 67 Each cell in the grid,
corresponding to a particular "class" of felony or misdemeanor and a
particular prior record "level," contains information about the
available sentence dispositions: an active prison term, a "community"
sanction, or an "intermediate" sanction. 68 The cell also contains
information about the durations of the prison terms the judge could
select, including a presumptive range, a higher aggravated range, and
a lower mitigated range.69
The sentencing judge can move out of the presumptive range
only after finding a legally sufficient aggravating or mitigating fact to
justify a departure from the normal range.7" Even though it has
proven easy for trial judges to find sustainable reasons to support

65. CLARKE, supra note 62, at 69-70.
66. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1380.2(h), 148-4.1 (2005); CLARKE, supra note 62, at
155-56; RONALD F. WRIGHT, MANAGING PRISON GROWTH IN NORTH CAROLINA
THROUGH STRUCTURED SENTENCING, PROGRAM Focus 3-4 (U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/168944.pdf
(chronicling the reasons for the failure of the Fair Sentencing Act).
67. See § 15A-1340.17(c) (setting out the North Carolina sentencing grid); North
Carolina Sentencing & Policy Advisory Comm'n, Felony Punishment Chart (1995),
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/felonypunishmentchart.
pdf. (last visited Aug. 31, 2006)
68. See § 15A-1340.11(1), (2), (6) (defining "active punishment," "community
punishment," and "intermediate punishment," respectively).
69. For a current version of the grids, see N.C. Court Sys., Punishment Grids,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Punishment.asp (last visited Sept. 1,
2006).
70. See § 15A-1340.16 (providing definitions and examples of aggravating and
mitigating factors).
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aggravated or mitigated range sentences7' (appellate review of this
question is practically non-existent), trial judges still sentence
offenders in the presumptive range most of the time.7 2 Some of the
cells in the grid designate only one "disposition" available to the
judge. For instance, all of the dispositions at class D and higher allow
only for active prison terms, while some cells in the lower portions of
the grid allow only for community or intermediate punishments.
Cells that are situated on the border between these parts of the grid
(sometimes called "border boxes")73 give the judge a choice between
two different dispositions (and in one cell on the grid, a choice among
all three dispositions).
Because the seriousness of the charge is one of the two leading
inputs into the sentencing calculation under this system, the decision
by a prosecutor to change the charges can have an obvious and
measurable effect on the sentence.74 But the effect of charge
reductions does not remain constant throughout the system.
Two features of the North Carolina laws should make charge
bargains especially attractive in cases that begin with relatively
serious charges. First, under the North Carolina sentencing laws,
prosecutors can initially select charges that place the defendant into a
grid box that demands an active prison term. In such cases, the
prosecutor's decision to reduce charges to another box that allows an
intermediate or community punishment effectively controls the
disposition because the North Carolina statutes disallow
"dispositional departures" by the judge.75
Second, the North Carolina grid allows for unusually broad
ranges when only an active sentence is at stake. In theory, sentencing
laws that place looser restrictions on the options of the judge should
make charge bargains less valuable. Conversely, any "sentence
bargain" (an agreement about the sentence that the parties will
71. See Ronald F. Wright, The Future of Responsive Sentencing in North Carolina,11
FED. SENT'G REP. 215, 216 (1999) (noting the ease with which judges can identify

aggravating and mitigating factors).
72. See N.C. SENTENCING &
POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N,
STRUCTURED
SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR

2003/04 16 (2005), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/
Documents/200304statisticalreport.pdf (reporting that 70% of all active sentences fell
within the presumptive range).
73. See WRIGHT, supra note 66, at 6 (describing the border boxes).
74. Cf. Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability within Sentencing

Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 694 (1993) ("When offenses are variously and
narrowly defined... more sentencing discretion rests with the prosecutor.").
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c)(1) (describing the "authorized"
punishments under sentencing guidelines).
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recommend) will grow more attractive to the parties. Because North
Carolina offers sentencing judges relatively broad sentencing ranges
when compared to other guideline systems, charge bargains will mean
less when the disposition options remain the same regardless of any
reduction in charges. Conversely, they mean more when the revised
charge makes a non-prison sentence possible.
In sum, charge
bargains should matter more when a disposition is at stake than when
a sentence duration is the key question.
B.

The Concepts of Depth and Distance

Prosecutors and defense attorneys negotiate about guilty pleas
for particular crimes, not just generic classes of felonies. The criminal
code restricts the options available to the negotiators: a proposed
reduction in charges is only plausible if the code offers some
alternative, at a lesser class, that could fit the facts at hand. A case
first charged as kidnapping (a class C felony) ordinarily cannot be
reduced to possession of cocaine (a class I felony), even though the
sentencing outcome might be acceptable to both prosecution and
defense.76 After the parties negotiate an agreement, the prosecutor
still must convince the judge that there is a factual basis to support a
conviction for the agreed-upon charge.77
The plausible lower charges within a code include any "lesser
included offenses": crimes that require the prosecution to prove
some subset of the elements of the most serious form of the crime, or
a lesser form of mens rea for one or more of the elements.78 For
instance, under the North Carolina code, common law robbery is a
lesser-included offense for robbery with a deadly weapon. 9 Simple
assault is a lesser-included offense for assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury.80
A code might also give the parties additional options, crimes that
have been labeled "situationally-included lesser offenses" because
they arise out of a single factual transaction even though the elements
of the first crime charged are not a subset of the elements of the
second crime.8 1 For example, some serious assaults might be reduced
76. In the data that forms the basis for our research, none of the cases originally
charged as kidnapping were later reduced to cocaine possession.
77. See § 15A-1022(c) ("The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.").
78. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (8th ed. 2004).
79. See §§ 14-87, 14-87.1 (defining various forms of robbery).
80. See §§ 14-32(b), 14-33(a).
81. See David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255,256-59 (1965).
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to a lesser form of robbery, even though the more serious crime
Taken
requires no proof that the defendant took property.82
together, the lesser-included offenses and situationally-included
offenses form "crime groups" that constitute the realistic charging
options for typical fact patterns in criminal cases.83
Groups of crimes that are viable charging options for a given set
of crime facts have two features that are pertinent for our purposes:
depth and distance. First, a group of crimes could show great depth if
84
it offers a large number of charges at different levels of sentencing.
A group that is perfectly deep might offer viable options at each
offense class below the most serious form of the crime. For instance,
a group might present options at felony classes D, E, F, G, H, and I,
along with misdemeanor classes Al, 1, 2, and 3. Second, two crimes
might show great distance if the sentences that flow from those crimes
are spaced far apart: perhaps a crime group starts with a class C
felony at the top of the scale of seriousness (with a presumptive range
of 58-73 months for Prior Record Level I), while the second crime
appears at class G (with a presumptive range of 10-13 months). A
shift from class C to class D (51-64 months) would involve a lesser
distance.
It is useful to think of depth as a characteristic of the original
charge at the time of filing (typically the highest available charge for
that case):
some charges have a large number of potential
destinations for a reduced charge, while other charges offer fewer
options at lower levels.8 5 By contrast, think of distance as a
characteristic of each potential destination for a reduced charge.
Some final destinations require greater movement from the original
charges than other destinations: if a case starts at felony class D, then
a reduction to a new charge at class I involves greater distance than a
reduction to some other option at class F.
This combination of distance and depth that the criminal code
makes available for a group of crimes is one important feature that
82. See §§ 14-32(a), 14-87.1 (defining felonious assault with a deadly weapon and
common law robbery). Table 2, infra, presents evidence that such charge reductions
occasionally do happen.
83. The coding documents for the North Carolina sentencing data place crimes
together in these functional groups.
84. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 512-20 (2002) (using "depth" to describe the number of charges available to
reach the same conduct under criminal codes and "breadth" to describe amount of
conduct reached by criminal code).
85. For an example of a group of crimes with relatively deep options, see the
discussion of assault crimes infra at Table 2.
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affects a prosecutor's power within a guideline system. Like the
width of the ranges available in a given cell on the sentencing grid or
the opportunities for judicial departures from the prescribed
sentences, distance and depth affect how much leverage prosecutors
hold in gaining guilty pleas and also determine how big an impact
charge reductions have on sentence severity.
There are reasons to believe that a group of crimes offering more
depth will produce a greater proportion of charge reductions than a
group of charges with less depth. The deeper options available to the
negotiating parties will give them more potential ways to find
common ground, a sentencing discount that reflects their shared view
about the value of the defendant's waiver of trial rights. 86 Put in
economic terms, deep options allow the prosecutor to offer a marketclearing price for a guilty plea more often.
The charging effects of long distances between bargaining
options are harder to anticipate. Greater distance between viable
charging options will increase the sentencing impact of a charge
reduction and will thus give the prosecutor a greater impact on the
bottom line in the case.8" The prosecutor, however, might hesitate to
pay this higher price unless the defendant can offer something
unusually valuable in return. This suggests, at first blush, that the
greater the distance between the original charge and a particular
destination crime, the less likely that a prosecutor would offer such a
reduction.
Alternatively, in some cases the prosecutor might find reasons to
ignore the greater distance and offer the reduction anyway. Some
lesser charges might require a factual element that is not often
present, particularly if the lower option does not qualify as a true

86. Cf Alschuler, supra note 7, at 567 ("Charge bargaining is not as capable of
making fine adjustments but must proceed by leaps from one charge to another. In one
case, an agreement to substitute the next available lesser offense for the offense that has
been charged may result in a conviction for only a slightly less serious felony. In another
case, 'going down to count two' may result in a misdemeanor conviction. In still another
case there may be no lesser offense that seems at all related to the defendant's conduct.");
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2486-91 (2004) (discussing bargaining effects of "cliffs" and "craggy slopes" created by
sentencing laws).
87. See Rodney Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretionand Sentencing
Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1366 (2000) (discussing the impact of
prosecutorial discretion on drug sentences when mandatory minimum sentences are
available).
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lesser-included offense.88 In such a situation, the prosecutor might
find it necessary to reduce the charge to some destination that lies a
greater distance from the original charge.
The dispositions available to the sentencing judge could also lead
defendants to negotiate with special urgency for larger distances in
charge movement. As the felony sentencing grid shows, certain cells
in the sentencing grid open up new disposition options for the judge:
blocks below class D allow for some non-prison punishments.8 9 Thus,
defendants might be willing to give up especially valuable defenses or
cooperation in other investigations in exchange for a chance to move
down to class E or lower and argue to the judge for an intermediate
or community punishment.
For instance, a defendant initially
charged with armed robbery at class D would certainly face a prison
term, while a defendant charged with common law robbery at class G
might receive an intermediate punishment. 90
For initial charges that begin at class E or lower (particularly for
defendants with no extensive criminal history), the value of a move to
some lesser level of felony might be negligible-an intermediate
sanction will carry roughly the same sting whether it is imposed for a
class E or a class I felony. Thus, for charges that start in a region of
the grid that already allows non-prison punishments, defendants
might hold out for charge movements into misdemeanor territory.
For this reason, a charge reduction that allows the prosecutor to
move a case out of the portion of the sentencing grid requiring an
active prison sentence and into a discretionary cell in the grid can be
thought of as having greater distance than a reduction that does not
change the basic options available for sentencing. Due to the
structure of North Carolina's guidelines, charge reductions have a
greater impact on disposition type among more serious than less
serious cases, and charge reductions have a greater impact on
sentence duration than on disposition type.

III. CHARGE MOVEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA
In this Part, we estimate the overall amount of charge movement
that occurs in one typical guidelines state: North Carolina. Further,
we detail how the movement of charges looks different for various
related groups of crimes and suggest how the depth and distance of
88. For instance, more serious assault charges might be reduced to a Class F felony,
assault on a handicapped person, but only if the victim meets the statutory definition. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32.1(a) (2005).

89. See North Carolina Sentencing & Policy Advisory Comm'n, supra note 67.
90. See infra Part III.A.
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the North Carolina Criminal Code explains some of the variation
among different groups of crimes.
The statistics maintained as a routine matter in North Carolina
make it possible to track charge movement. Because no parole
authority is available to shorten the sentences imposed under the
SSA, the legislature needs some assurance that the sentencing
decisions of trial judges will collectively match the available
correctional resources.91 The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Commission monitors sentencing practices in the state and
recommends adjustments in the sentencing rules when necessary to
prevent an imbalance. 2 To carry out this duty, the commission must
collect and analyze case data from the court system.
The commission's data for Fiscal Year 1999-2000, which form
the basis for our study, show all cases that were initially charged as
felonies and ended in a conviction.9 3 The data also show the most
serious felony or misdemeanor charge that formed the basis for
conviction (that is, the "final charge") and the sentence ultimately
imposed in the case. Table 1 gives an overview of charge movement
in North Carolina, indicating the percentage of the cases that
remained within the same class of felony between the time of initial
charge and the time of conviction, along with the percentage of each
class that moved to a different offense class before conviction.94 For
instance, 51.5% of the 11,614 cases originally charged as a class I
felony resulted in convictions for a class I felony, while 47.6% of
those cases resulted in a misdemeanor conviction.
91. See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'M, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 2 (2005), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/
Councils/spac/Documents/citizenguide2005.pdf.
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-36.7(d) (requiring that all bills coming before the
general assembly that would increase incarceration be accompanied by a financial report
prepared in consultation with the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory
Commission).
93. The major limitation of data like these is that they only track convictions, so many
of the biggest decisions by prosecutors go unobserved: decisions to decline prosecution, to
divert a defendant into non-criminal treatment programs, or to dismiss charges outright,
are arguably more important because they determine who is eligible for punishment.
Thus, from the perspective of prosecutorial discretion, we are missing many details that
might be important to explain prosecutorial choices. However, looking at this data by
comparison to the existing studies of sentencing practices, these data are strong.
Sentencing studies virtually never have measures of the underlying offense or initial
charges. They rely solely on the conviction offense to control "offense seriousness" and
most are subject to the criticism that they fail to take into consideration earlier decisions,
such as charging.
94. This table is drawn from the 2002 Sentencing Practices Study of the North
Carolina Sentencing Policy and Advisory Commission, and is based on the same FY 19992000 data that we analyze for the discussion of particular crime groups.
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Table 1. Most Serious Charged and Convicted Offense Class
Convicted
Offense Class

BI

B2

C

Charged Offense Class
F
G
D
E

H

I

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.5

0.1

0.1

0

0

0.2

0
0.5

0
0.1

0
0

0
0

0.2

0.1

0

BI

=

B2
C

4.6

14.9

M

1.0

0.9

D
E

4.3
5.2

15.7
5.6

4.6
19.6

7.5

F

40.2

31.5

8.8

3.4

G
H
I
Misdemeanor
Total Cases
Source: North

0

0.2

0.2

7.7

0

0.1

0

0

0
0.5
1.9
6.8
30.9
0
3.5
0.6
0.9
2.9
23.6
8.4
12.3
3.9
0.5
0
3.3
9.0
1.5
1.2
3.9
0
4.0
2.9
47.6
10.5
39.6
49.0
21.1
7.9
17.0
12.8
9.3
11,614
3,442
19,173
1,452 1,741
89
1,636
1,858
656
Carolina Sentencing Commission felony convictions data set for FY 2000

It is interesting to see confirmation in Table 1 that prosecutors
generally shift charges downward. It is unusual for the crime of
conviction to be more serious than the initial charge. Nevertheless,
upward movement is possible and could happen if new evidence
develops to justify the higher charge. The charges also might move
up if the prosecutor carries out a negotiation threat to file higher
charges after the parties fail to reach a plea agreement.95 It is
impossible to tell from Table 1 how often prosecutors mention the
prospect of raising charges, a negotiating tactic that might lead some
defendants to plead guilty to the existing charge.
The data show that the frequency of charge reductions is much
higher among more serious crimes than among less serious crimes.
Rates of charge reduction are very high (ranging from 60% to 82% of
all cases) among offense classes B1 to D, for which a prison sentence
is essentially mandatory. Charge reductions are also common (65%)
at class E, where a sizeable minority of offenders also fall into the
Active portion of the sentencing grid. Below that, charge reductions
are still very common, but much less so than for the cases falling in
the upper portion of the offense distribution. This appears to
correspond with the findings from Minnesota, described above, that
charge reductions were more common among cases that would have a
presumptive prison sentence if convicted as originally charged.

95. Based on informal conversations with prosecutors and defense attorneys, it is our
impression that potential habitual felon charges (a class C felony) are mentioned regularly
during plea negotiations.
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Charge Movements Within Crime Groups

It is possible to see the potential impact of code structure by
examining separately the charge movement that occurs within
different groups of related crimes from the North Carolina Criminal
Code.

The examples we explore here include violent crimes that

offer deep options (assault), violent crimes that offer fewer options
and more distance between options (robbery and kidnapping), and
non-violent crimes with deep options (burglary and cocaine
distribution and possession). Rather than attempting here to create a
precise measure for comparing the depth of differing groups of
crimes, we instead illustrate the potential influence of these code
features by reviewing a few clear-cut examples of greater and lesser
depth.
We begin with a relatively deep group: assault crimes. The same
basic cluster of facts could support charges of assault with a deadly

weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (a class C felony
with a presumptive range of 58-73 months),96 assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill (class E, 20-25 months), 97 assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury (also class E),98 assault
inflicting serious injury (class F, 13-16 months), 99 habitual
misdemeanor assault (class H, 5-6 months), 1°° assault on a female'0 1
or assault by pointing a gun'012 (both misdemeanor class Al, 1-60
days), and simple assault (misdemeanor class 2, 1-30 days).10 3 The
only offense levels below class C that lack a form of assault based on
common fact scenarios are felony classes D and G, and misdemeanor

96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a); North Carolina Sentencing & Policy Advisory
Comm'n, supra note 67 (showing presumptive sentencing ranges). The range of months
mentioned in the text assumes a minimal criminal history; more serious criminal records
would generate higher sentence ranges. See North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Comm'n, supra note 67. Other less frequently charged assaults at Class C
include malicious castration, § 14-28, and malicious maiming, § 14-30.
97. See § 14-32(b).
98. See § 14-32(c). Other less common assaults at Class E include castration or
maiming without malice aforethought, § 14-29, malicious throwing of corrosive acid or
alkali, § 14-30.1, malicious assaulting in a secret manner, § 14-31, or patient abuse and
neglect, § 14-32.2(b)(2).
99. See § 14-32.4(a). Other less common options at Class F are an aggravated assault
or assault and battery on a handicapped person, § 14-32.1(e), or patient abuse, § 1432.2(b)(3).
100. See § 14-33.2. Other options at Class H include assault by strangulation. § 1432.4(b).
101. § 14-33(c)(2).
102. See § 14-34.
103. See § 14-33(a).
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The movement among these related charges
classes 1 and 3.1°
appears in Table 2.105

Table 2. Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Assault

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
C

Most Common
Offense

Class C
(N = 675)
AWDW
IKSI

Charged Offense
Class F
Class E
(N = 146)
(N = 928)
AWDW
ASSAULT
SI
1K or SI

Total
(N = 1,749)

2 (<1%)

0

82(5%)

28 (4%)

1 (<1%)

0

29(2%)

AWDW IKSI

D

Vol.
Manslaughter,
Robbery w/DW

E

AWDW IK or SI

265 (39%)

234 (25%)

4(3%)

503 (29%)

F

Assault SI

66 (10%)

65 (7%)

43 (30%)

174 (10%)

G

Robbery,
Assault, Weapon
Possession

17 (2%)

16 (2%)

3(2%)

36(2%)

H

Other Assault,
B&E, Larceny,
Drug Possession
Total Felony

14 (2%)

34(4%)

6 (4%)

54(3%)

479 (71%)

367 (40%)

58 (40%)

904(52%)

161 (24%)" 465 (50%)

69 (47%)

695 (40%)

35 (5%)
196 (29%)

19 (13%)
88(60%)

149 (8%)
845(48%)

Misdemeanor
Al

1, 2, or 3

Assault SI (m),
AWDW (m),
Assault on
Female, Pointing
a Gun
Simple Assault
Total
Misdemeanor

96 (10%)
561 (60%)

104. The assaults available at these levels are specialized, requiring proof of facts that
do not occur often. For instance, assault on a sports official is a Class 1 misdemeanor,
§ 14-33(b)(9), and assault by a caretaker on a disabled or elder adult causing serious injury
is a Class G felony, § 14-32.3(b). The legislature amended the assault statutes in 1995
specifically to add depth to the available options and to reduce the distance between
offense levels for domestic violence assaults. WRIGHT, supra note 66, at 8-11.
105. The sum of cases contained in the rows for different offense classes do not
correspond exactly to the total number of felonies and misdemeanors because we have
removed a few final charges that include very small numbers. The same observation holds
true for subsequent tables in this Article.
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Given the depth of options available to prosecutors and defense
counsel during negotiations over assault charges, we would expect a
smaller percentage of assault crimes to remain at their initial level of
charging than other crimes starting at the same offense class. That
appears to be the case. For assault cases originally charged at class C,
only 12% remained at that level by the time of conviction. As Table
1 indicated, 33% of class C charges overall ended in class C
convictions. For assault crimes starting at class E, only 25% stayed at
that level (compared to 35% of class E felonies more generally).
Among the class F assault crimes, 30% resulted in a conviction at
class F (compared to 65% of the class F felonies more generally that
ended in a class F conviction).
As for the distance between the original charges and the reduced
charges, the most factually related lower charges (that is, the lesserincluded offenses) are the most common destination for the cases that
begin at the top of the scale. For class C assaults, the class D options
(voluntary manslaughter and robbery) require additional facts not
often present in a case originally charged as an assault. For many
class C assaults, there is no factually plausible option at class D. The
class E options therefore became the final charges most often, with
39% of the charges ending there.
For the assault charges starting at class E and class F, it appears
that the nearest options were not the most common. The parties
skipped past class H and ended most often with misdemeanor class
Al assaults; close to half of all cases took this route. The movement
across this extra distance might reflect the specialized proof necessary
for the class H version of assault (habitual misdemeanor assault) or
possibly the fact that defendants who face non-prison punishments
gain little from charge movement among the various lower levels of
felonies, where judges commonly impose non-prison sentences at
each of these levels. For these defendants, a discount from a nonprison felony sentence to a non-prison misdemeanor sentence might
often be the necessary price for a guilty plea.
In sum, the assault crimes seem to show both depth and distance
at work. The depth of charging options produces a higher than
ordinary level of charge movement. At the higher levels of the grid,
charges move across shorter distances more often than they move
across greater distances. At lower levels, however, the reductions
cover greater distances, perhaps because misdemeanor charges
become relevant in the negotiations when the original charge is a
lower-level felony.
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A different pattern of charge movement appears with robbery, a
group of crimes that offers only slightly fewer charging options for
negotiators but places longer distances between some of the
outcomes. The North Carolina code provides versions of robbery
offenses at class D (robbery with a deadly weapon),1 °6 class G
(common law robbery),1"7 class H (larceny from a person),0 8
misdemeanor class 1 (larceny), 0 9 and several other misdemeanors." 0
Given the relatively few felony options and the distance between
those options, we should expect a larger proportion of robbery
charges to remain at the original level of charging than other crimes
charged at that level. Again, that is what Table 3 shows.
Table 3. Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Robbery
Class D

Charged Offense
Class G

Total

(N = 1,302)

(N = 716)

(N = 2,018)

Robbery
w/DW +
Attempt

Common
Law
Robbery

Robbery w/DW +
Attempt

492(38%)

1 (<1%)

493 (24%)

E

Conspiracy,
AWDW 1K or SI

99 (8%)

0

99 (5%)

G

Common Law
Robbery

463 (36%)

325 (45%)

788 (39%)

H

Attempted
Robbery, Larceny
from Person
Total Felony

89 (7%)

168 (24%)

257 (13%)

1,220 (94%)

508 (71%)

1,728 (85%)

22 (2%)

21(3%)

43 (2%)

60 (4%)

186 (26%)

246 (12%)

82 (6%)

207 (29%)

289 (14%)

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
D

Misdemeanor
Al
1, 2, or 3

Most Common
Offenses

Assault w/DW,
Assault on female
Larceny, Simple
Assault, B&E
Total Misdemeanor

106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87. The presumptive range is 51-64 months. Id. § 15A1340.17.
107. § 14-87.1. The presumptive range is 10-13 months. § 15A-1340.17.
108. § 14-72(b)(1); § 14-70. The presumptive range is 5-6 months. § 15A-1340.17.
109. § 14-72(a) (goods not more than $1000); § 14-73.1.
110. § 14-73.1.
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The charges seem to move differently for the most serious
robberies than for the others. For armed robbery (and attempted
armed robbery, which the code treats as an equivalent crime),"' 38%
of the cases charged at class D remained at that level, higher than the
31% of the overall cases that remained at class D after beginning at
that level, as indicated in Table 1. Perhaps the gap between class D
(with a presumptive range of 51-64 months) and class G (10-13
months) was too large for the prosecutor to make the offer very
often. The jump between class D and class G also opens up the nonprison punishments, a price that prosecutors might find too steep in
many cases.
On the other hand, when the charges started lower down the
scale, at class G, only 45% of the cases remained at that level,
compared to the 62% of the cases remaining at class G overall. It
appears that the charging options for class H felonies or for various
misdemeanor crimes in the group created deep enough options for
the less serious robberies and enticed the parties away from the
original charges more frequently than the norm. Even slight concerns
about the quality of the evidence, or relatively light caseload
pressures in the office, could convince a prosecutor to offer the
defendant a discount this small.
Our examples so far have involved a group of violent crimes with
deep options up and down the scale of seriousness (assault) and a
group of violent crimes with greater distance between options at the
top of the scale and somewhat deeper options at the bottom
(robbery). We now turn to a group of violent crimes with shallow
options, but only modest distance between those options:
kidnapping.

111. See § 14-87(a) ("Any person or persons who ... unlawfully takes or attempts to
take .... ).
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Table 4. Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Kidnapping
Charged Offense
Class C
Class E
Conviction

Most Common

(N = 163)

(N = 101 )

Offense Class
Felony
C

Offenses

Kidnap 1

Kidnap 2

Total
(N = 264)

Kidnap 1 or 2,
AWDS IKSI

49 (30%)i!
I

0

49(19%)

D

Robbery w/DW

22 (14%)

0

22 (8%)

E

Kidnap 2

28 (17%) [41(41%)

69 (26%)

F

Felonious
Restraint
Total Felony

24 (15%)

23 (23%)

47 (18%)

141 (86%)

69 (68%)

210 (80%)

13 (8%)

22 (22%)

35 (13%)

9 (6%)

10(10%)

19(7%)

22 (14%)

32 (32%)

54 (20%)

Misdemeanor
Al
1

AWDW,
Assault on Female
False
Imprisonment
Total
Misdemeanor

The most serious option, class C (58-73 months presumptive
term), 112 stayed at this charging level at roughly the same rate as other
crimes: 30% for kidnapping, compared to 33% for class C generally.
The limited options further down the scale, at class E (20-25
months)' 3 and class F (13-16 months),1 involve relatively large
distances, both in terms of the durations and the dispositions
available at that offense level. The viable felony options for charges
starting at class E are even fewer, and the kidnapping cases move a
bit less often than other class E cases (59% of kidnapping cases move
off class E, compared to 65% of class E cases more generally).
Given that destinations for reduced charges in kidnapping cases
are not especially deep and involve relatively long distances, the code
offers the prosecutor little incentive to move the charges down. The
cases flow down the chart at roughly the expected rate, and the code
does not mute or amplify the effects of evidentiary problems,
caseload pressures, or other forces that normally lead to charge
bargains.

112. § 14-39(b) (first degree).
113. § 14-39(b) (second degree).
114. § 14-43.3 (felonious restraint).
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Finally, we survey two non-violent offenses: burglary and drug
offenses.
Table 5. Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Burglary, Breaking or Entering a Building
Charged Offense
Class G
Class H
(N = 224)
(N = 4,649)
Burglary 2
Break/Enter

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
D

Most Common
Offense

Class D
(N = 440)
Burglary 1

Burglary 1

47 (11)

0

0

47 (1%)

E

Att. Burglary 1

21(5%)

0

0

21 (<1%)

G

Burglary 2

90(20%)

78 (35%)

3 (<1%)

171 (3%)

H

Break/Enter,
Larceny, PSP

129 (29%)

82 (37%)

2,905 (62%)

3,116 (59%)

I

Break/Enter
Veh., misc.
Total Felony

7 (2%)

4 (2%)

79 (2%)

90 (2%)

305 (69%)

164 (73%)

2,993 (64%)

3,462 (65%)

19(4%)

3 (1%)

26 (<1%)

48 (1%)

116 (26%)

57 (25%)

1,630 (35%)

1,803 (34%)

135 (31%)

60 (27%)

1,656 (36%)

1,851 (35%)

Misdemeanor
Al

1, 2, or 3

AWDW,
Assault-SI,
Assault on
Female
Break/Enter
(m),Larceny
Total
Misdemeanor

Total
(N =5,313)

II

For burglary, few cases start as high as class D,115 and those cases
tend to move down more frequently than class D charges generally
do. The class G burglaries"1 6 move far more often than is typical for a
class G crime (62.1% of the class G crimes remain at that level, while
only 35% of the burglaries at class G remain at the same level).
The real action for felony burglary charges, with 4,649 cases,
starts at class H.117 These breaking or entering charges stayed at that
level somewhat more often than the norm (62% here versus 50.8%
for class H generally). The only lesser charges not requiring proof of
a specialized fact (such as breaking or entering a vehicle, a class I

115. § 14-51 (first degree).
116. § 14-51 (second degree).
117. § 14-54(a) (breaking or entering building with intent to commit felony or larceny
therein).
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felony)" 8 are misdemeanors." 9 It may be that the cases charged
initially at class H were especially easy to prove, making the

prosecutors unwilling to cross the costly distance between felony and
misdemeanor charges.
Our final example involves another group of non-violent offenses
with deep charging options: cocaine crimes.
Table 6. Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Selling or Trafficking Cocaine

Most
Common
Offenses

Conviction
Offense Class

Class D-G
(N = 401 )
Trafficking
Cocaine

Charged Offense
Class G
Class H
(N = 1,272)
(N = 3,362)
PWI,
Sell/
Conspire
Delivery
to Sell

Total
(N = 5,037)

Felony
Trafficking

Trafficking

D

13 (3%)

0

0

16(1%)

28(7%)

0

1 (<1%)

33(1%)

240(60%)

10(1%)

0

283 (6%)

294 (73%)

11 (1%)

1 (<I%)

336(7%)

81(2%)

935 (19%)

400g +

Trafficking
200g but less
than 400g
Trafficking
28g but less
than 200g;
Attempt or
Conspire
Total
Trafficking

F
G

Non-Trafficking
G

Sell or
Conspire to
Sell
PWISD,
Deliver
Possession
Total NonTrafficking

H
I
Misdemeanor
1
2
3

Possess
Paraphernalia
Assault,
weapon
Possess
Marijuana
Total
Misdemeanor

118. § 14-56.
119. § 14-54(b).

3 (1%)

-851 (68%) 1

49 (12%)

298 (23%)

-1789 (53%)

2,135 (42%)

25 (6%)
107 (27%)

80(6%)
1,232
(97%)

-1,102 (33%)
2,979 (89%)

1,207 (24%)
4,278 (85%)

0

31(2%)

360(11%)

391 (8%)

0

0

7 (<1%)

7 (<1%)

0

0

11 (<1%)

11 (<1%)

0(0%)

31(2%)

383 (11%)

414 (8%)
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Two features of Table 6 merit our attention. First, notice how
few of the cases that begin as trafficking charges are reduced to nontrafficking felonies or misdemeanors. This might reflect an office
policy among many district attorneys in the state to disfavor any
reductions in trafficking charges, or it may simply show that the
elements of drug trafficking are especially easy to prove at trial.
Unfortunately, our data do not include the quantity of drugs involved,
which is the critical factor in differentiating trafficking from nontrafficking offenses. Whatever the reason, this is one area where the
availability of deep options in the code has little impact.
As for the cases that are initially charged at class G and class H,
movement happens only slightly less often than the norm for these
felony classes (68% stability for sale of cocaine compared to 62.1%
for class G generally, and 53% for cocaine possession with intent to
sell or distribute compared to 50.8% for class H generally). The
available lower charges (primarily class I possession or misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia) might not leave enough options to
induce any extra charge reductions.
Overall, the kidnapping, burglary, and cocaine crime groups
show a few variations on how depth and distance can discourage
charge bargaining. The kidnapping group illustrates what happens
when the code presents few bargaining options to the parties: fewer
charge bargains are the natural result. The burglary group points out
the importance of the felony-misdemeanor line: although the code
offers reasonably deep options, the move from a felony to a
misdemeanor increases the relevant distance, and that greater
distance reduces the number of deals. Finally, the cocaine group
indicates that depth and distance standing alone do not explain all
charge movement. Even when the code offers relatively deep options
with varying distances available, charge bargaining might not flourish,
perhaps because the defendants in these easy-to-prove cases have
little value to offer in exchange for a reduced charge.
B.

Alternative Explanationsfor ChargeReductions

Our quick survey of crime groups under the North Carolina code
emphasizes one possible influence-code structure-on the
movement of charges. A number of different factors, however, surely
contribute to the charge movement that we observe in particular
crime groups. Prosecutors might decide to reduce charges based on
the seriousness of the original charge, the criminal history of the
defendant, the strength of the evidence, the credibility of the victim,
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prosecutor office policies, and countless other factors.12 ° The handful
of multivariate and qualitative studies that other researchers have
completed confirm the practical relevance of these types of reasons. 2 '
The cross-tabulations in this Part do not untangle these other
possible influences on charge movement from the effects of criminal
code structure. Yet the interactions among these factors are worth
exploring. Further research will be necessary to examine the overlap
between features of a criminal code, such as depth and distance, and
other features, such as offense seriousness, crimes against persons,
and crimes that fall into the "active prison term" zone of the
sentencing grid.
A closer study of the criminal code's effects on charge movement
should also account for some possible limits on the power of depth
and distance. The charge movements for crime groups in our study
suggest that lesser-included offenses count for more than
situationally-included offenses. The true lesser-included offenses
predictably give the prosecutor a case that fits the evidence at handthe evidence that originally supported the higher charge.
A
situationally-included offense (for instance, the use of robbery for a
case originally charged as a kidnapping) may require the existence of
122
extra facts that are only available in a few cases.
Our survey also suggests, in a preliminary way, that the sentence
dispositions available to the judge might either mute or amplify the
power of deep options or long distances between charging options.
For instance, both the assault crimes and the robbery crimes indicated
that the distance between charge options mattered most for charges
at higher offense levels, where active prison terms were the only
option. When moving down from a higher active prison term to a
lower active prison term, the distance between the different felony

120. See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION:

THE DECISION TO CHARGE A

SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 7-8 (1969) (creating a typology of reasons why prosecutors
decline or reduce charges); NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS § 42.3 (2d ed. 1991) (listing acceptable reasons for reducing charges). See
generally Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative

Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980) (discussing reasons for
declinations in one federal district).
121. See, e.g., Miethe, supra note 28, at 163-64 (discussing variables expected to
influence whether the felon receives a particular type of plea bargaining concession);
Miller & Sloan, supra note 42, at 115-16 (empirically examining the influence of multiple
factors as indicators of charging and sentence reduction).
122. See supra Table 4.
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levels took the central role in the plea negotiations. 123 On the other
hand, when a reduced charge makes possible a non-prison
punishment where none was available before, this new disposition
option becomes more important in the negotiations than the precise
number of felony levels between the charges or the precise difference
in the range of months available under the original charge and the
potential new charge.
Similarly, the line between felonies and misdemeanors might
amplify some of the influence of depth and distance in the criminal
code.
Felony convictions carry longer-term consequences than
misdemeanors, putting aside any reductions in the sentence for the
case at hand. The parties would naturally place less negotiating
weight on the number of felony options or the distance between them
if a misdemeanor charge is also on the negotiating table.
Thus, as a general rule, we might expect to see charges with deep
options producing more charge movement than a typical charge. And
generally speaking, those charge movements might end most often at
points that are less distant from the original charge. But the dividing
line between active prison terms and non-prison punishments, and the
dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors, both seem to
complicate the picture.
IV. THE SENTENCING IMPACT OF CHARGE MOVEMENT

Reductions of charges matter, first and foremost, because they
affect the bottom line of the sentence. In a jurisdiction that relies on
determinate sentencing laws, like North Carolina, it becomes possible
to quantify the amount of sentencing effects that can be traced to a
given reduction in charges.
Roughly speaking, the difference between the sentence
prescribed by the initial charge and the sentence prescribed by the
final charge of conviction shows the sentencing impact of prosecutors'
charge reductions.124 The gap between the presumptive sentences for
the conviction charges and the sentences actually imposed shows the
impact of other factors, beyond the selection or reduction of charges.
Those other factors might reflect the remaining judicial discretion to
choose among sentencing options or they might show the influence of

123. See supra Tables 2, 3 (showing that assault charges move more often across
shorter distances and that the distance between robbery charges prevented charge
movements from happening frequently).
124. It might also show the combined influence of the prosecutor and the defendant, as
reflected in plea negotiations.
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prosecutors' sentencing recommendations or factual stipulations
(such as the value of property destroyed or stolen).
Table 7 summarizes the impact of charge reductions on the
average presumptive sentence duration and the average sentence
duration ordered for each category of charges. Similar to Miller and
Sloan,125 we compare the mean presumptive sentence duration at the
initial charging with the mean presumptive duration at the sentencing
stage and the mean sentence duration ordered for these cases. We
also compute the average reduction in the presumptive sentence
between the time of original charging and the time of conviction. As
Table 7 shows, the impact of charge reductions on the average
presumptive sentence is substantial and is greatest for the more
serious crimes, both in absolute and relative terms. However, we see
meaningful differences in the magnitude of reductions among
different types of crimes, even those originally charged at the same
offense class.
For example, for offenders originally charged with assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDW
IKSI), a class C offense, the average presumptive sentence duration
dropped from 89 months for the original charge to 30 months at
conviction. The mean sentence duration actually imposed by judges
was about the same as the mean of the presumptive sentence spelled
out in the sentencing grid (29.7 months ordered by judges versus 29.6
presumptive). Thus, the average charge reduction in AWDW IKSI
cases is about 60 months. By comparison, for offenders originally
charged with first-degree kidnapping, also a class C offense, the
average presumptive sentence duration shrank from 94 months to 58
months-a substantial, but considerably smaller, reduction of 36
months.

125. Miller & Sloan, supra note 42, at 112-13.
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Table 7. Average Presumptive and Actual Sentences by Most Serious
Charged Offense
Offense
Class

Offense
Charged

C

AWDW IKS1

C
D
D
E
E
F
G
G
G
H
H

Presumptive
Duration at
Charging
89.4

Presumptive
Duration at
Sentencing
29.6

Kidnapping 1

94

Robbery
w/DW
Burglary 1
AWDW 1K
or SI
Kidnapping 2

75.6

Assault S1
Burglary 2
Corn Law
Robbery
Sell Cocaine
Break/Enter
PWI,
Delivery

Mean
Duration
Ordered
29.7

Mean
Charge
Reduction
59.8

% Charge
Reduction

57.9

60

39.7

37.8

77.4
27.1

16.6
11

27.4

67%

Mean
Sentence
Reduction
-0.1

%
Sentence
Reduction
0%

36.1

38%

-2.1

-2%

35.9

47%

1.9

3%

17
12

60.8
16.1

79%
59%

-0.4
-1

-1%
-4%

15.9

17.2

11.5

42%

-1.3

-5%

17.2
13.6
14.3

8.7
8.2
9.7

9.7
8.7
10.1

8.5
5.4
4.6

49%
40%
32%

-1
-0.5
-0.4

-6%
-4%
-3%

14.2
7.5
7.4

12
5.6
6.4

12
6.2
6.8

2.2
1.9
1

15%
25%
14%

0
-0.6
-0.4

0%
-8%
-5%

Mean Charge Reduction=Presumptive Duration at Charging - Presumptive Duration at

Sentencing
Mean Sentence Reduction= Presumptive Duration at Sentencing - Duration Ordered

A similar discrepancy in the magnitude of charge reductions
appears when we compare cases charged with first-degree burglary
with cases charged with robbery with a deadly weapon, both class D
offenses. The presumptive sentence among the burglary cases was
reduced by 60.8 months (from 77.4 to 17.6 months), while the robbery
cases dropped by about 36 months (75.6 months to 39.7 months).
Again, the average sentence duration ordered was very close to the
average of the presumptive duration specified in the sentencing grid
(38 months for robbery cases and 17 months for burglary cases),
indicating that these charge reductions are the driving force behind
the resulting sentences.
Disparities appear in the impact of charge reductions among
some less serious crimes as well. For example, three of the crimes we
examine originated as class G offenses: burglary 2, common law
robbery, and selling cocaine. Offenders charged at burglary 2 and
common law robbery had sentences reduced by an average of 5.4
months and 4.6 months, respectively, whereas offenders charged with
selling cocaine received an average reduction of only 2.2 months.
Importantly, we see the same pattern of greater and lesser charge
reductions if we focus on the relative magnitude of charge reductions
(that is, reductions measured as a percentage of the presumptive grid
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sentence for the original charge) rather than the absolute number of
months.
These data reveal that charge reductions truly do change the
bottom line at sentencing. In fact, Table 7 suggests that charge
reductions prior to sentencing have a much greater impact on
sentence duration than does the choice among sentencing options
under the grid. Actual sentences follow the presumptive guideline
range for the conviction offense (and criminal history) very closely.
For most of the crimes we examined, judges' average sentences were
slightly above the midpoint of the presumptive range, but even the
largest difference observed is only two months on average.
The patterns observed here are also consistent with our
predictions about the effects of the criminal code. The crimes that
receive the largest sentence reductions, AWDW IKSI and burglary 1,
have relatively deep charging options. Recall that relatively few of
these cases (12% and 11%, respectively) ended in a conviction for the
original charge filed. Perhaps more importantly, 29% of AWDW
IKSI and 31% of burglary 1 cases were reduced to misdemeanors,
receiving sentences that average less than three months.
Among the class G offenses, the impact of charge reductions on
sentences is greater for burglary 2 and common law robbery than for
selling cocaine. We suggest that this is, in part, due to the fact that for
burglary 2 and common law robbery the distance between the original
charge and the typical conviction charge is greater than the distance
between selling cocaine and the lesser-included offenses of possession
with intent or simple possession of cocaine. Twenty-seven percent of
burglary 2 charges and 29% of common law robbery charges were
reduced to misdemeanors (breaking or entering and larceny,
respectively) carrying sentences that averaged less than two months.
By contrast, the least serious of the lesser-included cocaine offenses is
possession, a class I felony for which sentences averaged more than
six months. 26
Thus far, our analysis of charge reductions and their impact on
sentencing has focused on changes in the presumptive sentence
duration. Although sentence duration is certainly an important
indicator of sentence severity, other dimensions of sentence severity
are also relevant. The sentencing disposition-thatis, the decision to
sentence offenders to an active prison term versus intermediate or

126. Appendices A through D provide additional detail regarding the magnitude of
charge reductions and their impact on sentences ordered for various combinations of
original charges and conviction charges.
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community-based sanctions-also captures an important measure of
sentencing effects.
As with the presumptive sentence duration, charge reductions
can affect the type of disposition options available to the judge at
sentencing. This is especially true for crimes that begin at class D or
higher and for offenders with considerable criminal history points, in
which cases an active prison sentence may be mandatory.1 27 In these
cases, a charge reduction can mean the difference between a certain
128
prison sentence and the possibility of not going to prison.
It is unclear, however, whether charge reductions will affect
sentence dispositions as profoundly as they affect sentence durations.
Under the structured sentencing grid, North Carolina judges retain
129
the power to decide the disposition type in the majority of cases.
That is, even if a charge reduction moves a case out of the "Active"
portion of the punishment chart, in most cases judges will still have
the option to order either an active prison sentence or an
intermediate punishment. Perhaps more importantly, because felony
defendants are concentrated at the lower levels of the punishment
grid, the vast majority of defendants would not face a mandatory
prison sentence even if they were convicted of the original charge.
The effect of charge reductions on the disposition is not obvious when
the charge both starts and ends in a portion of the grid that allows
(but does not compel) the judge to select a non-prison punishment.
To examine the impact of charge reductions on the sentence
disposition, we computed three measures for each offense type
charged: the percentage of cases that would have required the judge
to impose an active prison sentence if convicted of the original
charge, the percentage with required prison sentences based on the
final conviction charge, and the percentage actually receiving active
prison sentences. From these summary measures we also computed
the change in the percentage having a required prison sentence (%
Reduced). These data are presented in Table 8.

127. See North Carolina Sentencing & Policy Advisory Comm'n, supra note 67.
128. Approximately 5,000 North Carolina offenders would have received active prison
sentences in the year we examined if they had been convicted of the most serious crime
originally charged. About half of these were convicted of less serious crimes that did not
require an active sentence.
129. See N.C. SENTENCING &
POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, STRUCTURED
SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR

2004/05 2 (2006), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/
Documents/2004-05statisticalreport.pdf (showing percentage of felons within each grid

box).
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As with our analysis of the presumptive duration, it is clear that
charge reductions have a substantial effect on the type of disposition
required under the guidelines, especially for the more serious cases.
Among the defendants originally charged at class C (AWDW IKSI,
kidnapping 1) and class D (robbery with deadly weapon, burglary 1),
100% would result in a prison sentence if convicted of the original
charge. Most of these, however, were convicted of less serious crimes
for which a prison sentence was no longer required (though in most
cases it was still an option). Again, we see that the class C assault
cases and class D burglary 1 cases received the largest "breaks," with
73% and 87%, respectively, moving out of the "Active" portion of
the punishment chart. Even for defendants charged with kidnapping
1, who were the least likely to receive a disposition reduction, 40%
moved to charges where judges had the discretion to choose a nonprison sentence. Substantial reductions in the percentage facing
mandatory prison occur less often as we move down the seriousness
scale, because only a few of these offenders (those with considerable
prior record points) start out with a required prison sentence.
Table 8. Percent Active Sentence Required at Charging and
Conviction by Most Serious Charged Offense
Required
Active at
Charging
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Required
Active at
Sentencing
27.4%
59.5%
42.8%

Active
Sentence
Ordered
48.6%
71.8%
66.4%

%
Reduced
72.6%
40.5%
57.2%

100.0%
25.1%

13.0%
7.2%

42.5%
27.0%

87.0%
17.9%

29.7%
8.2%
4.9%
5.7%

13.9%
6.2%
3.1%
4.3%

32.7%
28.1%
29.9%
39.5%

15.8%
2.1%
1.8%
1.4%

G
H

Burglary 1
AWDW 1K or
SI
Kidnapping 2
Assault SI
Burglary 2
Corn Law
Robbery
Sell Cocaine
Break/Enter

3.4%
1.2%

3.1%
1.2%

34.7%
28.4%

0.3%
-0.1%

H

PWI, Delivery

0.7%

0.7%

21.5%

0.0%

Offense
Class
C
C
D
D
E
E
F
G
G

Offense Charged
AWDW IKSI
Kidnapping 1
Robbery w/DW

The effect that these reductions have on the rate of active prison
sentences is less extreme, however, than the effect of reductions on
sentence duration. Again, even when an active sentence is not
mandatory it is usually an option, and one that the judge uses
regularly. For each category of crimes we studied, the percentage of
those convicted receiving active prison sentences is much greater than
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the percentage for whom it would be required by the guidelines. For
example, the guidelines required an active prison sentence for 27% of
offenders originally charged with AWDW IKSI, but 49% actually
received active sentences.
More striking still, the percentage
receiving active prison sentences ranged from 22% to 40% even
among charging categories that required prison sentences for very
few offenders.13 This reveals that while charge reductions have a
considerable impact on sentence durations under structured

sentencing, their effect on disposition decisions is muted.
The impact of charge movement on sentence dispositions reveals

one of the ways that the structure of the sentencing guidelines can
either enhance or limit de facto sentencing power of prosecutors.
Some early guideline systems, such as those originally adopted in
Minnesota and Washington state, included a clear "disposition line":
cases on one side of the line would be sentenced to prison, while cases
on the other side of the line would not. 3' With that type of structure,

charge reductions determine more often whether judges can sentence
offenders to prison or not. In the present study, this does not appear
to be the case. By allowing judges the discretion to choose a prison
sentence in all but the least serious cases, the border boxes in the
North Carolina sentencing grid mitigate prosecutorial control over
punishment.'3 2
To summarize, charge reductions have a substantial effect on

both the disposition and on the duration of sentences. The impact on
sentence durations appears to be larger, however, than the impact on
imprisonment decisions. We believe that this is a function of the
structure of North Carolina's sentencing laws, which, for the majority

130. For felonies in Classes F, G, and H, the availability of non-prison dispositions
depends on the offender's prior record level.
131. See SHANE-DuBOW ET AL., supra note 62, at 164-66. Note, however, that the
Minnesota and Washington systems allow the judge to "depart" from the disposition

indicated in the guidelines, while the North Carolina system prevents any dispositional
departures, even while granting the judge more discretion over the in/out decision in some
grid boxes.
132. We should not assume, however, that sentencing dispositions reflect judicial
discretion rather than prosecutorial discretion, even when the North Carolina sentencing
grid leaves the choice open. It is likely that the type of disposition ordered often reflects a
prosecutor's recommendation that is part of the plea agreement. Although our data do
not allow us to test this, prosecutors may insist upon an "active" sentence
recommendation more often if they have already agreed to reduce the charge from one
where an active sentence would have been required. Thus, the actual sentence
dispositions we have observed likely reflect a combination of judicial and prosecutorial
influences.
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of cases, allow discretion in deciding the type of punishment to
impose.
We predicted not only that charge reductions would affect
sentencing, as others have alleged, but also that the structure of the
criminal code would be important in determining how great an impact
there is. More precisely, we hypothesized that the effect of charge
reductions on sentences would reflect two dimensions of the code,
which vary by offense type: the depth of charging options and the
distance between them. Our findings generally support this theory.
We observed that even among crimes charged initially at the
same offense class, some result in greater sentence reductions than
others.133 When the criminal code provides more options for reducing
charges, especially to lesser-included offenses, and when the distance
between those lesser offenses and the original charge is great, we see
relatively larger average reductions in the presumptive sentence. We
see examples of this both among more serious crimes and less serious
crimes.
The potential for misdemeanor charges has an especially
powerful effect on some crimes. Given the large break in average
sentences between low level felonies and misdemeanors, the
availability of a charging option at the misdemeanor level resulted in
larger reductions for some categories of crimes (e.g., assaults,
robberies) than for others (e.g., drug crimes).
CONCLUSION

In a jurisdiction like North Carolina that depends on determinate
sentencing laws, close attention to charge movement reaps big
rewards. A number of scholars have argued that efforts to regulate
judicial discretion, either through determinate sentencing systems,
mandatory minimums, or presumptive sentencing guidelines may
concentrate power over sentencing outcomes in the hands of
prosecuting attorneys. Little systematic empirical evidence exists,
however, about what prosecutors actually do with this theoretically
increased power. This Article attempts to shed some light on how
often prosecutors reduce charges and the effect that charge
reductions have on the severity of punishment in one state with
comprehensive sentencing guidelines.

133. Although our analysis does not provide a rigorous test of our prediction (i.e., we
have not controlled for other factors that might also be relevant, such as prosecutors'
priorities), the pattern of charge and sentence reductions is generally consistent with our
expectations.
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The analyses here reveal three major findings. First, in North
Carolina, prosecutors exercise their discretion to reduce the severity
of the primary charges filed, and they do so frequently. Although we
have not explored other types of charge reductions in this analyses
(e.g., decisions to reduce the number of counts or facts that could
affect the sentence), the data suggest that charge bargaining over the
offense seriousness is one of the central ways that cases are resolved.
Second, these charge reductions have substantial effects on the
severity of sentences imposed. The effects are largest on the duration
of active prison sentences, but they are also consistent and visible in
the sentence dispositions.
Third, we find that the frequency with which cases move from
the original charge to a lesser offense, and the average sentence
reduction that results, vary by crime type. This crime-specific lens
reveals that sentence reductions are partly a function of the structure
of the criminal code and the sentencing grid in North Carolina. It
appears that the same sentencing guidelines and crime definitions
that grant prosecutors greater power, relative to other sentencing
actors, also constrain prosecutor's choices in important ways. The
guidelines give, and the guidelines take away.
Our descriptive account of the connection between charge
reductions and sentences could form the basis for more well
elaborated theories of the prosecutor's work. By detailing the
contribution of charge movement to the sentences that defendants
serve, our project moves beyond a blanket description of
"prosecutorial discretion." We hope that our tour around the North
Carolina criminal code inspires much further attention to charge
movement, particularly in jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines and
other forms of determinate sentencing. There is much to learn about
the typical reductions of charges in different settings, lessons holding
real value both for criminal practitioners and academic observers.
We close with some practical implications of our research.
Imagine the impact on criminal practice everywhere if both
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys routinely knew and used
the sort of charge movement information set out in this Article. For a
given defendant, the attorneys could open an online database and
search for similar cases to determine a typical range of charge
movements.1 14 As for which cases are similar enough to the case at

134. Cf. Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform Through Sentencing Information Systems,
in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121,123 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (creating a similar

proposal for a sentencing information system).
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hand, each attorney could select variables that seem relevant, drawn
from a standardized list (such as the original charge, the county, a
range of dates, the criminal history, and other variables that
experience might suggest). With these competing versions of the
relevant comparison groups, the attorneys would enter plea
negotiations with the real power to argue about meaningful
uniformity in sentencing. The power of transparency in charge
movements could transform criminal justice in ways that are hard to
predict, but fascinating to ponder.
Finally, lawmakers in North Carolina as well as other states may
find valuable lessons in these data as they consider creating or
revising the laws of sentencing. First, the data suggest that sentencing
laws are only sometimes applied in the way that legislators might
When legislators or sentencing
have anticipated or intended.
commissions create or modify sentencing guidelines, they should keep
in mind that the limitations they place on judicial discretion have
important implications for the balance of power among prosecutors
and judges, and that the real impact of any guidelines will depend on
how those guidelines are used in negotiating guilty pleas. Second,
lawmakers would do well to recognize that "mandatory" prisons
sentences, whether designated for specific crimes or for whole classes
of crimes, as in North Carolina, are seldom mandatory in practice.
Our findings show that the crimes for which the guidelines mandate
active prison sentences are the ones that are most likely to result in
substantial charge reductions. Finally, these findings should give
pause to anyone who assumes that North Carolina's structured
sentencing has achieved uniform and equitable sentencing practices.
Although our data do not allow us to test whether sentences are more
or less uniform now than they were prior to the enactment of
guidelines, the evidence clearly shows that offenders who are charged
with similar crimes-especially the most serious crimes-often receive
very different punishments.
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Appendix A. Sentence Characteristics by Charged Offense and
Conviction Offense: Assault
Charged Offense

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
C

E

F

1

2

Class E
(N = 928)

Class F
(N = 146)
ASSAULT
SI

Most
Common
Offenses

Sentence
Ordered

AWDW
IKSI

AWDW
IK or SI

AWDW IKSI

Min.
Months
% Active

89.63

116.00

91.3%

100.0%

0.0%

27.69

27.26

27.00

50.9%

35.9%

50.0%

18.44

17.98

18.35

30.3%
40.60

26.2%
25.96

32.6%
18.70

57.2%

35.4%

36.2%

AWDW 1K
or SI

Assault SI

Total Felony

Misdemeanor
Al

Class C
(N = 675)

Assault SI,
AWDW

Simple
Assault

Simple
Assault
Total
Misdemeanor

Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active

4.02
25.5%

21.5%

24.6%
1.81

27.3%

19.1%

20.0%
1.11

53.8%

25.0%

2.69

2.64

0.0%
3.54

27.6%

21.6%

22.7%

27.6%

21.6%

22.7%
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Appendix B. Sentence Characteristics by Charged Offense and
Conviction Offense: Kidnapping

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
C

Most Common
Offenses
Kidnap 1 or 2,
AWDS IKSI

Sentence
Ordered

Charged Offense
Class C
Class E
(N = 163)
(N = 101)
Kidnap 1
Kidnap 2

Min. Months

102.49

% Active

98.0%

D

Robbery w/DW

Min. Months
% Active

75.50
100.0%

E

Kidnap 2

Min. Months
% Active

32.29
75.0%

27.90
46.0%

F

Felonious
Restraint

Min. Months

17.50

18.87

33.0%

26.0%

8.83

15.25

17.0%
68.17
78.7%

50.0%
23.97

2.48

2.85

23.0%

14.0%

Min. Months

1.83

2.52

% Active
Min. Months

33.0%
2.25

30.0%
2.74

% Active

27.3%

18.8%

% Active
H

Break and
Enter

Min. Months

Total Felony

Min. Months

% Active
% Active

Misdemeanor
Al

AWDW,
Assault of
Female

Min. Months
% Active

False
Imprisonment
Total
Misdemeanor

39.1%
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Appendix C. Sentence Characteristics by Charged Offense and
Conviction Offense: Robbery

Conviction
Offense Class

Felony
D

E

G

H

Most
Common
Offense

Robbery or
Att Robbery
w/DW

Consp.
Robbery
AWDW-SI,
Kidnapping 2

Common Law
Robbery

Att. Common
Law
Robbery,
Larceny From
Person
Total Felony

Misdemeanor
1

Larceny

Total
Misdemeanor

Sentence
Ordered

Class D
(N = 1,302)
Robbery or
Att Robbery
w/ DW

Charged Offense
Class G
Class H
(N = 716)
(N = 47)
Common
Att.
Law
Common
Robbery
Law
Robbery

Min.
Months

69.92

94.00

% Active

97.2%

100.0%

Min.
Months

26.36

46.00

% Active

45.5%

100.0%

Min.
Months
% Active

14.66

14.84

51.2%

44.6%

8.42

8.63

7.79

33.7%
40.14

36.9%
13.34

21.4%
7.59

68.3%

42.0%

25.0%

2.01

1.98

1.84

38.5%
1.96

34.9%
2.10

0.0%
1.94

39.0%

33.3%

6.7%

Min.
Months

% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
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Appendix D. Sentence Characteristics by Charged Offense and
Conviction Offense: Cocaine
Charged Offense
Class G
Class H
(N = 3,362)
(N = 1,272)
PWI,
Trafficking
Sell or
Conspire
Delivery
Cocaine
to Sell
Class D-G
(N = 401 )

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
Trafficking
D

F

G

Most Common Offense

Trafficking 400g +

Trafficking 200g < 400g

Trafficking 28g < 200g;
Att. or Conspire
Total Trafficking

Non-Trafficking
G

H

I

Sell or Conspire to Sell

PWISD, Deliver

Possession

Total Non-Trafficking

Misdemeanor
1
Poss. Paraphernalia

Total Misdemeanor

Sentence
Ordered

Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.

87.77
69.0%
56.43
89.0%
32.45

32.90

% Active

81.0%

80.0%

Min.
Months
% Active

36.90

32.90

80.6%

80.0%

19.61

14.05

14.07

52.8%

37.0%

17.3%

9.39

8.28

8.03

39.0%

34.6%

29.9%

13.41

6.38

5.75

36.4%

16.3%

9.3%

19.63

12.22

7.76

45.8%

35.1%

22.0%

2.31

2.05

19.4%
2.31

17.5%
2.02

19.4%

17.8%

Months

Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active

Min.
Months
% Active
Min.
Months
% Active

